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INTRODUCTION
For two decades after the courts struck down the Communications Decency Act in 1997, direct government regulation of the internet was a political third rail. That era of digital salutary neglect arguably 
contributed to American dominance in consumer software applications; if 
software has eaten the world, to extend Marc Andreessen’s metaphor, the 
all-you-can-eat buffet line started in the United States.1 As a result, U.S. tech 
hubs have been the destination for global capital and skilled immigrants, 
mitigating the economic effects of the Great Stagnation as the manufacturing 
industry moved overseas.
Recently, however, there has been growing support for internet regula-
tion. Remarkably for an era of heightened political polarization, represen-
tatives of both major U.S. parties have called for antitrust action against big 
tech companies. These critics argue that the companies’ market dominance 
leads to excessive political influence and poor outcomes for consumers.2 
This paper does not address these antitrust issues.
Instead we examine another plausible regulatory response to market 
domination: public oversight of private companies according to a public 
3SOCIAL MEDIA REGULATION IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
interest standard. The prospect of a new era of public interest oversight 
should not be dismissed out of hand. Multiple politicians from both parties 
have called for the federal government to take an active role in fighting 
various online social ills, including hate speech, gun-related content, polit-
ical bias, and sexual trafficking. In theory, public interest regulation could 
address these ills while also dealing with market power. In practice, public 
interest regulation could very well fail to accomplish those goals while cre-
ating negative unintended consequences.
The first section of this essay explores the growing interest in cross-ap-
plying the public interest standard from broadcasting to the internet. The 
second section recounts the history of the standard and the problems it 
created for free speech. The third section considers the implications of our 
historical analysis for public and private policymaking going forward.
A REVIVED PUBLIC INTEREST STANDARD
Proposals to regulate social media and the internet are solu-tions in search of justifications. Simply put, there are few digital-era regulatory precedents for government oversight of the internet. 
Instead, advocates have turned to the history of broadcast and telecommu-
nications regulation to find examples of regulatory mechanisms that might 
be applied to the internet. Contemporary techno-progressives are borrowing 
ideas from progressive broadcast reformers of the early to mid-20th century.3
Most of these proposals are ultimately rooted in the idea that the internet 
should be regulated according to the “public interest,” an echo of wording 
in the Radio Act of 1927, which established what was then an unprecedented 
level of federal government control over a communications medium. Of 
course, in the broadest possible sense any government action that involves 
the taking of property or the restriction of liberty needs to be justified by an 
appeal to the public interest or commonweal. That is not the sense of the 
term as it is used by communications scholars, for whom the “public inter-
est” is a way of describing a body of administrative law that evolved from 
the regulation of broadcasting and telecommunications. To put it in simple 
terms, the public interest standard is used to describe a diverse set of media 
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and telecommunications policies—including cross-media ownership bans, 
station licensing, and the Fairness Doctrine—that would be constitutionally 
prohibited were they applied to other domains like print media.
But today there is an ongoing effort by media scholars and policy ana-
lysts to expand the reach of the public interest standard to include the inter-
net. For example, a committee from the Stigler Center for the Study of the 
Economy and the State at the University of Chicago recently called for con-
ditioning Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996—which 
is widely acknowledged as the crucial deregulatory legislation that helped 
bring about a wave of consumer internet innovation—on “compliance with 
various public interest requirements drawn from media and telecommunica-
tions policy traditions.”4 Prominent media scholar Philip M. Napoli recently 
wrote a book that advocated reviving the public interest criterion to guide 
new regulations of the internet.5 Other proposals may not use the precise 
phrase “public interest,” but their contents are similar in form to old public 
interest-based concepts, as with Senator Josh Hawley’s (R-MO) proposal to 
enforce “political neutrality” on internet platforms.6
These proposals are not necessarily futile ab initio. The U.S. Supreme 
Court validated government regulation of the content of broadcasting 
because of the scarcity of the airwaves, a decision that has not been over-
ruled.7 (Although the scarcity rationale would not seem especially apt for the 
internet and social media, which are unconstrained by the electromagnetic 
spectrum.) However, Napoli identifies several other ways to justify internet 
regulation that have previously been accepted by the courts: Social media 
might be seen as a public resource, pervasive or ancillary to other regulated 
technologies.8 Each of these arguments could be used to justify media regu-
lation in the public interest.9 The public interest standard may not ultimately 
be embodied in new legislation regulating the internet, but it has returned to 
the policy agenda at a time when regulations seem likely, so it is a contender 
worthy of public attention.10 
We should bear in mind that public interest arguments reflect a tradition 
that sees the First Amendment as empowering the government to pursue 
public ends through public means rather than as defending individual rights 
against government abridgment. The idea for the former—“First Amend-
ment collectivism,” as Napoli calls it—can be traced back to Alexander 
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Meiklejohn’s famous remark that “what is essential is not that everyone 
shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said.”11 In this view, 
government should regulate speech to produce a “rich public debate,” pro-
moting favored speech rather than simply being satisfied with whatever 
follows from everyone being allowed to speak as an individual right.12 The 
public end in view is called “democracy” or perhaps the “public interest” 
(the two concepts are often used interchangeably).13 Earlier First Amendment 
scholars of a collectivist bent recognized that these ends might require “lim-
its on autonomy” and urged care in suppressing speech that did not enrich 
public debate.14 In contrast, Philip Napoli emphasizes the benefits of speech 
regulation rather than its risks.15 Inevitably, the public interest standard 
gives public officials leverage over political speech. Perhaps that leverage 
will be used to improve public debate, but traditional liberals are inclined 
to believe that such authority will more likely serve the narrow interests of 
elected officials and dominant interests. 
 Given that would-be regulators are explicitly borrowing public interest 
concepts from the history of broadcasting, it is worth examining how those 
precepts actually worked (or not, as the case may be). This essay examines 
four cases: Bob Shuler’s battle in the early 1930s with the Federal Radio 
Commission, the Roosevelt administration’s attempt to keep anti-New Deal 
newspapers out of radio, and two instances of bipartisan abuse of the Fair-
ness Doctrine. These stories illustrate the gulf between the public interest 
as an abstract ideal and the public interest as it was actually applied by the 
government. This history should inform our policies going forward.
FOUR CASE STUDIES
Bob Shuler vs. the Federal Radio Commission
This study of the public interest standard begins a century ago with a sur-
prising individual, the Reverend Robert P. Shuler, a Methodist minister and 
radio broadcaster from Los Angeles nicknamed “Fightin’” Bob Shuler for 
his cantankerous preaching. In the 1920s and early 30s, he clashed with 
the newly commissioned Federal Radio Commission, setting an important 
legal precedent for regulating the airwaves in the public interest. There are 
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lessons to be learned from the early days of radio regulation—which followed 
a decade of relative laissez-faire and rapid growth—for those who would 
apply similar standards to the internet today.
Los Angeles in the 1920s was a boomtown, filled with oil derricks and 
liquor smugglers. As the oil bubble burst in 1927, Shuler was a key player 
in exposing a major political scandal involving the Julian Petroleum Cor-
poration. Julian executives defrauded local investors of $100–$200 million 
(nearly $3 billion in 2019 dollars) with the help of local businessmen and 
politicians. Grand juries indicted several of those involved, but the slow 
pace of the prosecutions led the Supreme Court of California to dismiss the 
charges en masse for failure to provide a speedy trial. 
Shuler blamed both the District Attorney of Los Angeles County, Asa 
Keyes, and Los Angeles City Prosecutor Lloyd Nix for the failure, implying on 
air that Keyes was in the pocket of the indicted businessmen and that Nix was 
negligent. Shuler’s broadcast attacks forced Keyes to resign; the disgraced 
former district attorney would indeed later be convicted of taking a bribe 
from a Julian executive. Nix, also forced to resign, would eventually extract 
a measure of revenge on Shuler, but not before the imbroglio peaked with 
the killing of one of the indicted businessmen by a defrauded investor who 
carried a printed copy of one of Shuler’s broadcasts in his pocket bearing the 
title “Julian Thieves in Politics.” Nix claimed during an interview on another 
radio station that Shuler had as good as pulled the trigger by inciting public 
outrage over the acquittals in the first place.
Shortly after the Julian scandal resignations, Shuler had created such 
a political backlash against Los Angeles Mayor George Cryer for his ties to 
organized crime that Cryer opted not to run for reelection in 1929. The new 
mayor, John C. Porter, was supported by Shuler, who had picked him for office 
after seeing him on the grand jury that had indicted District Attorney Keyes 
for bribery. In addition, eight out of nine Shuler-backed candidates won seats 
on the city council.16 But Shuler had won that influence by making enemies 
out of almost every major institution in the city, including the Chamber of 
Commerce, the Bar Association, and multiple judges he had antagonized by 
accusing them of being soft on organized crime. (Shuler would be convicted 
of two counts of contempt of court for criticizing a judge.) Shuler may have 
been the most influential person in the city in 1930, but he was also the most 
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disliked. It is hard to imagine Shuler’s anti-corruption campaigns succeeding 
without the radio station KGEF. His enemies, perceiving this as well, used a 
new regulatory tool to make that thought a reality. 
During the 1920s, the boom in Los Angeles had been matched only by the 
rapid expansion of radio broadcasting, expanding from a niche interest early 
in the decade to being an appliance in a majority of households in California 
by 1930.17 Congress passed the Radio Act of 1927, which authorized the new 
Federal Radio Commission (which would become the Federal Communica-
tions Commission in 1934) to impose order on the industry. The Act gave the 
Federal Radio Commission (FRC) authority to determine station frequency 
allotment, a decision freighted with consequence given that applicants were 
expected to have raised the capital necessary for equipment and operations 
prior to applying for a spot on the spectrum. Hundreds of thousands, even 
millions of dollars rode on any given licensing decision; regulatory capture 
was a natural outcome, with applicants pulling strings with commission-
ers and congressmen for preferential treatment. The system rewarded the 
well-connected and the well-financed. 
Furthermore, the Radio Act of 1927 charged the FRC with the responsibil-
ity to regulate the airwaves in the “public interest, convenience, or necessity.” 
Simultaneously, Section 29 of the Act prohibited censorship or any interfer-
ence with “the right of free speech by means of radio communications.”18 
As we will see, there was an inherent tension between those two charges, for 
how could the FRC decide that one radio station licensee’s broadcast speech 
was more in the “public interest” than another applicant’s speech without it 
being an act of censorship? Even if the question of censorship were set aside, 
the very concept of a singular “public interest” was an open invitation to 
majoritarian suppression of minority voices.
The new FRC immediately ran into trouble untangling the compet-
ing claims of applicants for the most desirable portions of the broadcast 
spectrum (a problem compounded by congressional pressure to divide the 
number of licenses equally among five geographic zones regardless of actual 
demand or relative population levels). Based on the legal fiction of spectrum 
scarcity, the FRC tended to favor well-capitalized station affiliates of the 
emerging major networks over independent outfits while working to reduce 
the total number of station licenses, preferring a smaller number of powerful 
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stations over a larger number of local stations.19
In addition, the FRC rewarded stations that promised to avoid political 
radicalism and to promote majoritarian values. For example, in 1933 stations 
WIBO and WPCC in Chicago had their licenses revoked; their spectrum was 
granted to station WJKS in Gary, Indiana, both for sake of geographical 
balance and because WJKS’s programming was “well designed to meet 
the needs of the foreign population,” by which the FRC meant programs 
“stress[ing] loyalty to the community and the Nation” and “instruct[ing] in 
citizenship and American ideals and responsibilities.”20 Meanwhile radical 
political groups with radio stations, such as WCFL (owned by the Chicago 
Federation of Labor) and WEVD (owned by the Socialist Party of Amer-
ica; the call sign referenced the recently deceased Eugene Victor Debs), 
struggled with heightened regulatory scrutiny after the FRC labeled them 
“propaganda” stations serving only a narrow interest and not the general 
public interest.21 However, in both cases the FRC’s efforts at asserting its 
authority to regulate radio licensees based on whether their programming 
was in the “public interest” was at least partially thwarted—albeit not with-
out difficulty—given the ability of each group to rally significant national 
pressure campaigns on their behalf, such as WEVD convincing New York 
Evening Post publisher Oswald Villard and educator John Dewey to speak 
out on the issue.22 
The FRC would find greater success going after radio stations owned by 
individuals with fewer elite connections. The most famous involved homeo-
pathic practitioner John Brinkley, who used the station KFKB (“Kansas 
Folks Know Best”) to peddle his patent medicines and surgical “cures” for 
infertility, which involved implanting goat glands in the testes. The outra-
geousness of Brinkley’s medical fraud made him an easy target for public 
interest action; the case continues to attract significant scholarly attention 
today. When the FRC denied KFKB a license renewal, Brinkley took the 
case to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia complaining that 
the denial—which all involved agreed was predicated on the content of his 
programming—violated Section 29 of the Radio Act of 1927, prohibiting cen-
sorship. The court ruled that no censorship was involved because the FRC 
had based its decision on the basis of “past conduct” rather than exercising 
prior restraint.23 
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It was a very narrow definition of censorship, one that applied only to 
radio and not to newspapers. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court would rule just 
four months later in the landmark case Near v. Minnesota24 that newspapers 
could not be gagged by state laws even on the basis of their prior content. 
When Minnesota passed a law targeting a newspaper that had criticized 
the state government, it was a violation of the First Amendment, but when 
California passed a “radio slander bill” that was “admittedly aimed at the 
activities of [the] Rev. ‘Bob’ Shuler,” it was not.25 Simply put, under the public 
interest standard free speech and press protections were significantly weaker 
for radio broadcasters than for newspaper publishers.
To return to the case of Bob Shuler and KGEF in Los Angeles, Shuler had 
neither the elite friends of WEVD, the institutional support of WCFL, nor the 
approved programming of WJKS. And the court to which he would appeal 
his own case, the D.C. Court of Appeals, had just issued a precedent in regard 
to Brinkley that would undermine Shuler’s ability to make an effective First 
Amendment plea. Shuler was in trouble, but that was not immediately obvi-
ous when the FRC first announced a special hearing into the license renewal 
of KGEF in the fall of 1930. After all, at the time KGEF ranked fourth (of 20) 
in a poll of the most popular stations in Los Angeles and it had a regular 
listening audience of some 600,000 people.26 Little more than a year previ-
ously he had unseated the mayor, toppled the corrupt district attorney, and 
forced the city prosecutor to resign, moves praised even by many of Shuler’s 
critics as necessary reforms to the city government. But Shuler’s influence 
was predominantly built on the radio, not through newspapers. And radio 
stations needed government licensure through the FRC, a license granted, in 
part, based on whether past programming had fulfilled a vague notion of the 
“public interest” or, as the case may be, a very specific vision of the public 
interest. That was all the leverage that Shuler’s political enemies needed. 
Earlier, shortly before the FRC hearing, ex-Mayor George Cryer had 
tried to punish Shuler via ordinary channels, suing him for defamation 
after Shuler accused Cryer of abusing the mayor’s office. However, the jury 
acquitted Shuler; headlines about the failed attempt at retribution must have 
heaped insult on injury. Cryer had another chance with the FRC hearing; he 
was one of several dozen former Shuler opponents who testified at the hear-
ing.27 But the most determined of those involved was Lloyd Nix, the former 
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city prosecutor that Shuler had pushed to resign over the Julian scandal.
Technically, Nix was not the instigator of the hearing—that honor went 
to a local restaurant supplier who averred to be simply a concerned citizen 
who wanted to stick up for his slandered friends—but Nix volunteered his 
time to serve as attorney for the complainant. Nix also convinced a distin-
guished East Coast communications attorney to travel to Los Angeles to 
serve as co-counsel and even paid his substantial hotel expenses out of 
pocket. Nix’s efforts were rewarded when the complaint over KGEF’s license 
renewal resulted in the FRC making two unprecedented decisions about the 
handling of the hearing. In every prior case, FRC hearings of this type had 
been held in Washington, D.C., but the FRC held this hearing in Los Angeles, 
which allowed Nix to call dozens of witnesses to testify in person. Even more 
surprising was the FRC’s decision to allow the complainants’ attorneys to 
conduct the proceedings. Typically, the FRC’s examiner would question 
witnesses and generally act like a prosecutor. But in this hearing, Nix would 
effectively prosecute Shuler while the FRC examiner acted as judge.28
Throughout the FRC hearing and later court appeals, Shuler’s attorneys 
made the mistake of assuming that appeals to the First Amendment would 
find purchase. But both the hearing examiner and the D.C. Court of Appeals 
adopted the narrow definition of censorship as limited to prior restraint. 
According to that logic, since this was a license renewal and not an initial 
application, it would not be censorship to deny Shuler’s license on the basis 
of his controversial programming. Much of the hearing consisted of antipa-
thetic witnesses recounting Shuler’s attacks on their character and policy. 
Neutral observers might have thought that they were watching a trial for 
defamation or libel, except that the man conducting the proceedings, Nix, 
had a clear conflict of interest and the burden of proof rested definitively 
on Shuler, who had to affirmatively prove that his statements advanced the 
public interest. 
This he could not do, so everyone involved was surprised when the FRC 
examiner, Ellis Yost, held that Shuler should have his license renewed. How-
ever, his reason for doing so was revealing. Yost acknowledged that Shuler 
had been “extremely indiscreet” in his broadcasts by “reflecting upon the 
character of a citizen, based solely on rumors and unverified reports.”29 How-
ever, Shuler’s broadcasts only accounted for three hours a week compared to 
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the other 20 hours a week the station gave mostly free of charge to groups like 
the Union Rescue Mission, the Boy Scouts of America, and the Los Angeles 
Conservatory of Music.30 Yost was fine with censoring Shuler on the basis of 
his programming content; he simply thought it unfair that these other groups 
should be punished for Shuler’s excesses.
That might have been that, but Nix and the complainant appealed the 
examiner’s ruling to the full Federal Radio Commission, which overruled Yost 
and denied KGEF its license renewal. Shuler then appealed the FRC’s decision 
to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which echoed the FRC’s reasoning in its 
ruling. The FRC and the circuit court believed that Shuler’s offenses were so 
onerous that allowing them to compose even a small fraction of KGEF’s pro-
gramming violated the public interest. Specifically, the commission pointed 
to Shuler’s obstruction of “the administration of justice” (his contempt of 
court charges), “offend[ing] the religious susceptibilities of thousands” (he 
criticized the Catholic Church), inspiring “political distrust and civic discord” 
(toppling the Cryer administration), and “offend[ing] youth and innocence 
by the free use of words suggestive of sexual immorality” (Shuler once said 
the word “pimp” on the air). Ultimately, Shuler was condemned because he 
had used the airwaves as “a theater for the display of individual passions 
and the collision of personal interests.”31 In other words, Shuler had treated 
KGEF as an outlet for advancing his own beliefs and had failed to prove to 
the commission or the court that doing so represented the public interest. 
As a result, he would be denied access to the airwaves. 
Shuler’s hearing was fundamentally political in nature. No matter how 
crude his conduct, Shuler had used KGEF to intervene in local politics and 
lost his station as a result. If this had happened in any other medium—print 
or newspaper—it would have been protected speech. His accusers would 
have been required to prove their complaints of defamation and claim com-
pensation for a tort in an actual court of law. The managing director of the 
National Association of Broadcasters—the primary industry association—
proposed filing an amicus brief if the Supreme Court decided to hear Shuler’s 
appeal (which it did not), calling the case “a discrimination against broad-
casting in favor of newspapers” and citing Near v. Minnesota. The American 
Civil Liberties Union did file an amicus brief for KGEF, as it did in the cases 
of WCFL and WEVD, though it made no difference in the final result.32 
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Shuler’s case also serves as a reminder that the conceit of a singular 
“public interest” is exactly that. Was it in the public interest of the citizens of 
Los Angeles to have one of the 18 stations in the town owned by a muckrak-
ing, albeit reform-minded, broadcaster? Shuler’s popularity with a weekly 
listening audience of 600,000 suggested a certain kind of vote by radio dial 
democracy. Lloyd Nix, George Cryer, Asa Keyes, and their friends clearly 
disagreed. Would the calculus have been different if Shuler had spoken for 
only two hours a week on the air rather than three, or if he had forced the 
resignations of only one official instead of half a dozen? No firm answer could 
have been given to any of these questions since the FRC had no firm guide-
lines. And, of course, if KGEF had been a newspaper, these questions would 
never have needed to be asked in the first place. The FRC had been given an 
impossible mandate: It was the overseer of a system of government-issued 
radio licenses to be distributed in artificially limited numbers according to 
the vague-by-design public interest standard and enforced via an opaque 
and arbitrary process that was supposed to simultaneously avoid censorship 
while still making decisions based on broadcast content.
In other cases, the FRC would rule that advertisements for contracep-
tives, betting lines, and mildly provocative innuendo from starlet Mae West 
were quite obviously not in the public interest. In 1939, the FRC considered 
formal guidelines prohibiting “favorable references to hard liquor,” “exces-
sive suspense on children’s programs,” and “excessive playing of recorded 
music to fill air-time”; 33 the FRC would not officially adopt the guidelines—
though there are many cases at the time of individual stations penalized for 
violating these preferences34—but they served as a reminder that the public 
interest standard was defined by majoritarian cultural values. In the FRC’s 
view, license-holders should advance Victorian mores and moral self-im-
provement, not frivolity, consumption, and sexual license. The Commission 
also kicked off decades of conflict between religious groups for a shrinking 
share of free sustaining airtime.35
The New Dealers vs the Newspapermen
In terms of the politics of the public interest, political right and left alike 
complained about the FRC enforcing a species of consensus liberalism. For 
example, the FRC praised stations that promoted “the national preparedness 
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movement” by liaising with the American Legion; meanwhile pacifistic pro-
gramming was labeled propaganda. And the problem would only worsen as 
the decade advanced. After the start of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 
New Deal reforms, a commissioner at the newly renamed Federal Commu-
nications Commission (FCC) sent a letter to stations telling them that it was 
“their patriotic, if not bounden and legal duty” to reject any advertisers 
“disposed to defy, ignore, or modify the codes established by the N.R.A. 
[National Recovery Administration].” After all, station licenses were not the 
actual property of the licensee. Given that they were “using valuable facilities 
loaned to them temporarily by the government,” they had an obligation to 
support rather than undermine federal policy.36  
That episode of unsubtle, pro-New Deal pressure is also a reminder that 
the urge to use the public interest standard to advance political interests 
would be as great a temptation on the national level as on the local. The 
Roosevelt administration had credited the president’s landslide election 
victory in 1936 to his effective use of radio. Jim Farley, then the chairman of 
the Democratic National Committee (DNC), believed that radio was necessary 
to do “the work of overcoming the false impression created by the tons of 
written propaganda put out by foes of the New Deal,” an impression that was 
“washed away as soon as the reassuring voice of the President of the United 
States started coming through the ether into the family living room.”37 As a 
new mass medium, radio allowed politicians like FDR to bypass preexisting 
media power structures—in this case print journalism—and appeal directly 
to voters. It was a presidential “fake news” defense but set in the 1930s. 
Despite his dominant election victory in 1936, Roosevelt was worried 
by the growing number of newspapers buying radio stations (a third of 
the total by 1939) given that the percent of newspapers declaring support 
for his candidacy dropped from 41 percent in 1932 to 37 percent in 1936 
and down to only 25 percent in 1940.38 Conservative-owned newspapers 
were running editorials criticizing New Deal programs and accusing FDR of 
creeping authoritarianism. FDR’s response did little to persuade his critics 
otherwise. During the ‘36 election, the administration had gone through 
back channels to urge the FCC to deny or delay radio station licenses to 
several newspapers that supported his political opponents. Still frustrated 
with critical newspaper coverage in 1938, the administration leaked that 
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Roosevelt was contemplating firing the entire slate of FCC commissioners 
for their inaction.39 
Roosevelt did not carry out that threat, but the next year he appointed 
a new FCC Chairman, ardent New Dealer James “Larry” Fly. In December 
1940, frustrated once again by sinking newspaper support for his candidacy, 
FDR asked Fly if he would “let me know when you propose to have a hearing 
on newspaper ownership of radio stations.”40 Fly’s successor as chairman, 
Paul Porter, would later say, “This was a fetish of [Roosevelt’s] ... and he was 
constantly putting the blow torch on Larry.”41 The president’s request put 
Fly in an awkward position. He was committed to the New Deal and loyal 
to the president, but he was also an ardent civil libertarian who would lose 
his job several years later partly because he opposed the FBI’s request for 
warrantless wiretapping authority. Roosevelt also made it clear that if Fly “got 
in trouble” on the radio ownership issue, the proposal would be disavowed 
by the administration. And Fly had other priorities as commissioner that he 
lavished more political capital and attention on, particularly the push for 
regulation of chain broadcasting. But in March of 1941 Fly did accede to the 
president’s request and announced FCC hearings into newspaper ownership 
of radio stations.42
The hearings were meant to determine whether the “joint association 
of newspapers and broadcast stations tends ... to prejudice the free and fair 
presentation of public issues ... cause editorial bias ... or to inject editorial 
policy or attitude into the public service rendered.” The predetermined 
answer was, of course, yes to all of the above, but Fly simply did not have 
the political capital to fight the newspaper industry. Instead, after 17 days of 
hearings the FCC stopped the proceedings. Even if the hearings did not lead 
to a formal newspaper ownership ban, at the start of the hearings Fly had 
placed a temporary ban on the issuance of powerful FM licenses to newspa-
pers, limiting them to the weaker AM frequencies. And when the hearings 
ended, Fly did not remove the ban, leaving newspaper FM applications in 
regulatory limbo for the next two and a half years until Fly’s successor offi-
cially declared an end to the investigation under congressional pressure.43
All of the parties involved in this fight—Fly, Roosevelt, and the newspa-
permen—claimed that they were the actual defenders of the public interest 
and that it was the other parties who were subverting the will of the people.44 
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In private, however, they could be more blatant about the pragmatic consider-
ations involved. For example, when the president accused Chairman Fly once 
again of dawdling on the newspaper ownership question, Fly responded that 
he needed to orchestrate the hearings so as to avoid the appearance of being 
motivated by “punitive political considerations towards the press.”45 That was, 
of course, the actual motivation, but the president had learned a lesson about 
the importance of keeping up democratic appearances after the embarrassing 
failure of his Supreme Court packing scheme a few years earlier.
In the case of both Roosevelt’s newspaper ban and Bob Shuler’s KGEF 
fight a decade earlier, the FRC/FCC offered a new arena for the politically 
well-connected to circumvent judicial or legislative due process in order to 
gain political advantage. On two occasions in the late 1930s, pro-New Deal 
congressmen sponsored bills that would have ordered the FCC to enact the 
newspaper ownership ban, but the administration lacked the necessary 
political support for the measure.46 Pressuring the FCC—an administrative 
agency headed by a presidential appointee—was a cleaner, simpler way of 
getting the president what he wanted. Whether or not that was in the public 
interest, it was certainly in FDR’s own best interests.
The Fairness Doctrine vs the Radio Right
The death of FDR in 1945 and Republican control of Congress after the 1946 
midterm elections led to a decade and a half of salutary neglect towards 
broadcasting on the part of the FCC. Attempts at further public interest-based 
regulation were generally honored in the breach. Concerns over network 
domination of radio broadcasting faded as the networks shifted their atten-
tion to television. The percentage of radio stations controlled by network affil-
iates dropped precipitously as most new licenses went to small-scale, inde-
pendent station owners. It was, in a sense, a return to the radio landscape of 
the late 1920s and, like then, it entailed a resurgence of political radicalism 
from both the left and right on the airwaves. Cash-strapped independent 
station owners were willing to air programs from a new wave of conservative 
broadcasters.47 Indeed, by the early 1960s there were a dozen right-wing 
broadcasters airing on a hundred or more stations nation-wide, forming a 
kind of ad hoc syndicated network of stations airing conservative shows.48
Meanwhile, a new generation of public interest advocates—young, 
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idealistic lawyers fueled by New Frontier zeal—had been nominated to 
the FCC by President John F. Kennedy. Commissioners like Newton Minow, 
William Henry, and Kenneth Cox believed that broadcasters had forgotten 
their obligation to educate and uplift the public. Of course, their definition of 
what counted as educational and uplifting did not include conservative ideas 
or advocacy, or at least not in the proportion that they were currently being 
communicated over the airwaves. Furthermore, the Kennedy administration 
had its own complaints about the constant attacks on its legislative agenda 
by conservative radio hosts. Surely it was not in the public interest to allow 
the “Radio Right” to undermine trust in the administration? This alliance 
between well-intentioned public interest advocates and administration 
officials using public interest rhetoric to advance narrowly partisan interests 
would lead to the most successful episode of U.S. government censorship of 
the past half century. They singled out conservative broadcasters for targeted 
audits by the Internal Revenue Service and created front organizations that 
would launder administration talking points and generate complaints about 
stations for the FCC. Ultimately, they pressured hundreds of radio stations 
into dropping conservative programming altogether.49
But the details of the Kennedy administration’s censorship campaign 
most pertinent to our discussion of the public interest standard revolve 
around the partisan deployment of a newly enhanced set of regulations 
known as the Fairness Doctrine. A detailed examination of the evolution of 
the Fairness Doctrine would require a much longer treatment, but suffice 
it to say that the rule was rooted in the public interest standard. As already 
discussed, in the 1920s and 1930s the FRC defined stations that broadcast 
only one point of view—whether socialist, religious, or conservative—as “pro-
paganda” stations, unlike stations that promoted broadly acceptable politics. 
That general suspicion of stations controlled by political advocates 
had crystallized into the FCC’s Mayflower ruling during Fly’s chairmanship. 
Station WAAB in Massachusetts was owned by the Yankee Network, a sec-
ond-tier regional network that frequently aired critiques of the New Deal and 
Roosevelt administration.50 When WAAB was up for license renewal in 1939, 
the Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., owned by a disgruntled former Yankee 
employee, filed a competing claim for the license. The FCC threatened to 
award the license to Mayflower until Yankee promised to drop its offensive 
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editorializing habits. As Fly wrote, “A truly free radio cannot be used to advo-
cate the causes of the licensee. It cannot be used to the support of principles 
he happens to regard most favorably. In brief, the broadcaster cannot be an 
advocate.” It was awfully convenient, of course, for the Roosevelt adminis-
tration that the Mayflower ruling punished a station supporting the political 
opposition, coming as it did in 1941, the same year that the Commission 
launched its investigation of newspaper ownership of radio. By the end of the 
decade, however, the FCC realized that the Mayflower decision was having a 
chilling effect on radical political speech. Radio station owners were avoiding 
editorializing in general in order to avoid the semblance of advocacy. This 
was not the outcome that sincere public interest reformers had hoped for, 
so in 1949 the FCC released a clarification of the Mayflower rule that allowed 
airing “the licensee’s personal viewpoint” as long as it was “part of the more 
general presentation of views or comments” on issues of public importance.51
The Mayflower doctrine would be revised again in 1959 to include an 
equal time requirement for political candidates, one that would be given 
the imprimatur of Congress, which was worried about bipartisan balance in 
television coverage during the upcoming 1960 election. The FCC also added 
a requirement to notify people when they’d been attacked on the air and the 
rules were renamed the “Fairness Doctrine.” However, it was not until 1963 
that any attempt at enforcing the Fairness Doctrine would be made. That year, 
in the middle of a fight with conservative broadcasters over the Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty, President Kennedy appointed a new FCC chairman, E. William 
Henry, and told him, “It is important that stations be kept fair.”52 Two months 
later, Henry would announce a “clarification” of the Fairness Doctrine reit-
erating that stations were not licensed “exclusively for the private interest” 
of their owners but to air programs that dealt with “issues of interest to his 
community, and in doing so ... be fair.”53 
The clarification signaled the FCC’s intent to take Fairness Doctrine 
complaints from listeners into account when renewing station licenses. 
Shortly thereafter, the White House would secretly organize the Citizens Com-
mittee for a Nuclear Test Ban to combat criticism of the treaty by demanding 
response time from stations under the threat of lodging a Fairness Doctrine 
complaint with the FCC.54 And when a small station in Cullman, Alabama, 
offered a response time slot to the Committee—but only if they paid for the 
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airtime—the FCC that fall issued an update known as the Cullman Doctrine 
that obligated stations to provide response time gratis if the respondent said 
they could not pay.55 In the 1960s, the enhanced Fairness Doctrine rules were 
without exception enforced against stations airing conservative programs. 
After JFK’s assassination and during the election of 1964, the Democratic 
National Committee used Fairness Doctrine complaints to intimidate radio 
stations into dropping broadcasters who supported Republican presidential 
nominee Barry Goldwater and to secure free airtime for the Lyndon Johnson 
campaign, some 1,700 free broadcasts in the final weeks before the election.56
Nixon and CBS News
Although the Kennedy administration was the first to use the Fairness Doc-
trine to advance their political interests, the temptation to do so was a bipar-
tisan impulse. Not long after the election of 1968, members of the Nixon 
administration began scheming about how they might use the Fairness 
Doctrine to intimidate television networks that portrayed administration 
policies in a negative light, particularly in their coverage of the Vietnam War.
For example, during the intense antiwar demonstrations of October 
1969, President Richard M. Nixon told his staff to take “specific action relating 
to what could be considered unfair network news coverage,” saying it not 
once but 21 times. This scattershot response to displeasing coverage was 
not very effective, so Jeb Magruder, one of Nixon’s operatives working for 
the Committee to Re-Elect the President (CRP, later mockingly nicknamed 
“CREEP” by the media), argued for replacing Nixon‘s “shot-gun” method 
with a more targeted, “rifle”-like approach. Magruder’s inspiration was 
the Kennedy administration, which, in his words, “had no qualms about 
using the power available to them to achieve their objectives.”57 Magruder’s 
plan involved, among other measures, monitoring broadcasts in order to 
“make official complaints” via the FCC, which was then chaired by recent 
Nixon appointee and former Republican National Committee chairman 
Dean Burch.58
The first test for Magruder’s plan came when recently retired NBC News 
anchor Chet Huntley said of Nixon in an interview, “The shallowness of the 
man overwhelms me; the fact that he is President frightens me.”59 Nixon 
was furious at the slight, so Magruder promptly released a “plan on press 
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objectivity,” the ultimate goal of which was to “tear down the institution” of 
the press and “generate a public re-examination of the role of the media in 
American life.”60 The networks, worried about the effect on public relations, 
forced Huntley to apologize, but the Nixon administration had bigger plans. 
They wanted to “plant a column” with a sympathetic outlet calling for “a 
blue-ribbon media ‘watchdog’ committee to report to the public on cases of 
biased reporting.”61 They would then have a Republican senator write a pub-
lic letter to the FCC proposing that newsmen should be licensed since “the 
airwaves belong to the public,” which “should be protected from the misuse 
of these airwaves by individual newsmen.”62 The Nixon administration 
wanted to fully weaponize the public interest standard to spare the president 
public embarrassment and to undermine opposition to its legislative agenda.
However, Magruder and the rest of the CRP team found that the mere 
threat of regulatory scrutiny was often enough to compel compliance. After 
the Huntley controversy and various regulatory tweaks by Dean Burch, 
CRP operative Chuck Colson found that the network television heads were 
“accommodating, cordial and almost apologetic” in private meetings.63 
CBS told Colson that every administration had asked for more favorable 
coverage since “every Administration had felt the same way”; Nixon’s oper-
atives had actually “been slower in coming to them to complain” than their 
predecessors had been.64 By September 1970, the Nixon administration 
had bullied the networks into a submissive state that lasted another year or 
so. Broadcast television resistance had mostly been neutered; it would be 
print media—with its stronger legal protections and lack of a public interest 
standard—that would take the lead in challenging the administration over 
the next several years.
After the 1972 election, the White House renewed its efforts to control 
network coverage, which had taken a negative turn in keeping with the crum-
bling situation in Vietnam. Clay T. Whitehead, the head of the White House 
Office of Telecommunications Policy, proposed changes to the Communica-
tions Act of 1934. When station licenses were up for renewal, according to a 
speech Whitehead delivered that winter, their owners would be required to 
demonstrate that they were “substantially attuned to the needs and interests 
of the community” and that they had offered a reasonable opportunity for the 
“presentation of conflicting views on controversial issues.”65 Local station 
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managers and network officials would be held responsible for “all program-
ming, including programs that come from the network.” Those that did not 
correct imbalances or bias in network political coverage would be “held fully 
accountable by the broadcaster’s community at license renewal time.”66 
This policy would have had some bite. If a station could not demonstrate 
meaningful service to all elements of the community, the license would be 
denied renewal by the FCC. That stick was proffered along with two carrots: 
The license period for stations would be extended, and challenges to license 
renewal would become harder to sustain.67
Earlier in American history, it had been the political left that had raised 
concerns about a private monopoly over the airwaves. Now, from the political 
right, Whitehead traced the problems in media bias to “excessive concen-
tration of control over broadcasting,” presumably by the networks.68 Such 
control, he argued, was as bad when it came from network headquarters in 
New York City as it was when exercised by the government from Washington, 
D.C. Whitehead had taken up the anti-monopoly cause and ended up with 
something like the “right to hear” interpretation of the First Amendment by 
the Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC in 1969; rather than 
thinking of the First Amendment as a negative restriction against constraints 
on speech, the Court viewed the First Amendment as a positive means to pro-
mote underrepresented speech, even if doing so meant legal favor for certain 
kinds of speech over others. This would be done by preventing monopoly 
control over information; from the perspective of the Nixon administration, 
that meant breaking apart a perceived monopoly of outlets and journal-
ists whose politics favored the political left. Nixon’s team wanted to force 
broadcasters to present points of view favorable to the administration: “The 
Fairness Doctrine became the Holy Writ; and the ‘King Richard version’ 
called for local stations to enforce it on pain of being put out of business if 
they did not.”69 
This time the news media outlets were not as quick to capitulate as 
before. A Washington Post editorial captured the spirit of the harsh response 
that met Whitehead’s speech: “[T]he administration is endangering not 
simply the independence of network news organizations, but the fundamen-
tal liberties of the citizens of this country as well.”70 NBC president Julian 
Goodman joined in, writing, “Some federal government officials are waging 
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a continuing campaign aimed at intimidating and discrediting the news 
media, and the public has expressed very little concern.”71 And Robert G. 
Fichtenberg, chairman of the freedom of information committee of the Amer-
ican Society of Newspaper Editors, called the proposed licensing standards 
“one of the most ominous attacks yet on the people’s right to a free flow of 
information and views.”72 The Nixon administration’s 1972 proposals were 
not included in subsequent legislation nor were they publicly mentioned 
again by officials.
By the end of that year, Nixon and CRP were too busy trying to handle 
the fallout from the Watergate scandal to lean on the networks over coverage 
of the Vietnam War. Still, their early efforts to control the networks in 1969 
and 1970 had, as Charles Colson privately reported to H.R. Haldeman, intim-
idated the network heads: “They are very much afraid of us and are trying 
hard to prove they are ‘good guys.’”73 The effects of the Whitehead plan are 
more difficult to assess. Even though it was later withdrawn, the proposals 
may have affected the judgment and actions of network news executives in 
much the same fashion as the earlier campaign clearly had. Nonetheless, 
the Nixon administration’s use of the Fairness Doctrine was, in its own way, 
nearly as successful as the Kennedy administration’s efforts a decade earlier, 
though Kennedy targeted small, independent radio stations while Nixon 
went after the major television networks. Both were designed to control 
criticism of the government without falling afoul of the Constitution’s ban 
on direct censorship. 
The final rotten fruit of Nixon’s use of FCC regulations to cripple his 
political opponents was a ban on newspapers owning more than a single 
television station in any major media market. Katharine Graham, the owner 
of the Washington Post—which had played a vital role in exposing the Water-
gate scandal—believed that the rule was meant to intimidate her into silence 
by threatening her ownership of two television stations in Florida. She would 
later write that “of all the threats to the company during Watergate ... [this 
was] the most effective.”74 Graham sold off one of the stations in order to 
avoid the threat of heightened regulatory scrutiny, but Nixon’s tactic might 
have worked on a less stalwart or less wealthy person, potentially stifling 
the coverage that ultimately led to his downfall.
Nixon’s cross-media ownership rule fulfilled the promise of Roosevelt’s 
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cross-ownership proposal 30 years earlier. Roosevelt wanted to punish con-
servative newspaper owners by barring them from owning too many radio 
stations. Nixon wanted to punish liberal newspaper owners by barring them 
from owning too many television stations. Both Roosevelt and Nixon used 
the public interest regulatory apparatus in order to censor speech they found 
inconvenient. Bear in mind that the text of the cross-media ownership rule 
said nothing about regulating broadcast content. It is an important reminder 
that even regulations that purport to be “content-neutral” can be used to 
mask censorial purpose. 
 
Summary
There is a line of jurisprudential reasoning running through all four episodes, 
but there are other fundamental themes that connect them as well. Each case 
reveals the insoluble tension between an obligation to regulate broadcasting 
in the public interest while simultaneously avoiding censorship. Each case 
reveals just how foolhardy the pursuit of a singular public interest is, as if 
there exists some Platonic ideal of a unitary, homogenous public for techno-
cratic regulators to identify and altruistically serve. Each case is a reminder 
of just how easily public interest mechanisms can be used to advance parti-
san or private interests; indeed, it is when well-intentioned public interest 
reformers have had the most influence that the risk of regulatory capture by 
baser political operatives has been most acute. It is not at all obvious that 
the public interest standard in broadcasting has served the public interest. 
When the Fairness Doctrine was finally taken to the Supreme Court in 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC (1969)—a case secretly manufactured by an 
operative working for the Democratic National Committee—the Court upheld 
the Fairness Doctrine on public interest grounds, citing Shuler’s case, Trin-
ity Methodist Church, South v. FRC, and the Mayflower decision among the 
precedents.75 It is interesting, however, that the Court was much more con-
cerned about the possibility of censorship than the courts had been in those 
prior cases, when they had simply stipulated that the FRC/FCC could not be 
guilty of censorship so long as they avoided prior restraint and adhered to 
the public interest standard. By contrast, Justice Byron White wrote that evi-
dence of “self-censorship” by stations avoiding Fairness Doctrine complaints 
would “indeed be a serious matter.” White’s concerns over censorship were 
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assuaged when the FCC’s attorneys told the Court that “the fairness doctrine 
in the past has had no such overall effect” and that self-censorship was “at 
best speculative.”76 If the Court had known that the explicit purpose of the 
enhanced Fairness Doctrine rules was to encourage stations to self-censor 
and to drop conservative programming for the benefit of the Kennedy and 
Johnson administrations, they might not have been so blasé, but that was 
information the Court was not privy to.
As noted earlier, the Red Lion decision remains an active precedent.77 
The Fairness Doctrine was overturned via the political process, not through 
the courts. Which means that if reformers can successfully assert that the 
internet falls under the public interest standard, Red Lion could be used 
to defend expansive internet speech regulations. So far proponents have 
been unable to make the public interest standard stick. The last attempt to 
apply the standards to internet content providers was the Communications 
Decency Act of 1996, which the Supreme Court struck down in Reno v. ACLU in 
1997.78 The Court explicitly rejected Red Lion because “the special factors rec-
ognized in some of the Court’s cases as justifying regulation of the broadcast 
media”—namely, the scarcity rationale—were “not present in cyberspace.” 
Without the scarcity principle, broadcast public interest standards could not 
be applied to internet regulation. That seemed final at the time, but when the 
courts close a door, sometimes they leave open a window. 
As noted earlier, media scholar Philip Napoli argues that there is an 
alternative to the scarcity rationale that would justify the extension of the 
public interest standard to the internet. Napoli believes that the broadcast 
spectrum, like the air or the water, is a public resource “owned by the peo-
ple.” As such, it is “public property subject to complete regulation by the 
federal government.”79 And so Napoli proposes that aggregated internet user 
data be defined as a public resource, which would provide “a grounding for 
the imposition of content-related public interest obligations in a manner sim-
ilar to the way that the public resource character of the broadcast spectrum 
justifies a range of content-related public interest obligations.”80 Napoli’s 
novel public resource approach has yet to be tested in court, but it serves 
as a reminder that the jury is still out on whether public interest standards 
could be applied to the internet.
The Carter and Reagan administrations abandoned the doctrine as part 
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of their general efforts to deregulate the economy. Yet the interpretation of 
the public interest as fairness in speech might have been revived in later 
administrations and, under Red Lion, might have passed constitutional 
muster. But for that to happen, the doctrine had to offer a net benefit to a 
political interest. The Kennedy and Nixon episodes discussed earlier sug-
gested that neither of the major political parties could expect net benefits 
from a renewed broadcasting standard. Of course, broadcasters had paid 
the costs of the old doctrine and had little reason to expect a different out-
come under a new version. Political calculation, not the courts, brought the 
Fairness Doctrine to an end. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
To revive the public interest standard and apply it to the internet, policymakers first need to deal with the basic flaw of those rules, namely the way in which they can be manipulated to advance 
private or partisan interests at a cost to freedom of speech. It is not obvious 
that they have fully grappled with that flaw. In June 2019, Senator Josh Haw-
ley introduced the Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act.81 Operating 
from the mistaken belief that Section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act of 1996 requires that tech companies provide “a forum free of political 
censorship” in order to enjoy an exemption from publisher liability, Hawley 
proposed giving the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) certification author-
ity over content moderation by large internet platforms.82 Under Hawley’s 
plan, every two years tech companies of a certain size would have to prove 
to the satisfaction of at least four of the five members of the FTC that their 
content moderation had been politically neutral. The bill further specifies 
that “information content providers” (websites) should “submit complaints 
or evidence that they have been subject to politically biased content moder-
ation” and testify to that effect at certification hearings. If platforms fail to 
prove their neutrality, they would lose Section 230 liability protection and 
face a wave of lawsuits. Most tech companies would be much less valuable 
without Section 230 protections, giving government regulators tasked with 
serving the public interest immense leverage over internet companies, not 
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unlike how prior administrations exercised leverage over broadcast networks 
through the FCC and its licensing process. 
How might that leverage work? The bill states that a certification of 
neutrality must be approved by “at least 1 more than a majority of the [five] 
Commissioners.”83 To be precise, at least one member of both parties would 
have to approve the certification. This requirement might seem to serve the 
cause of free speech. After all, if a tech company sought to suppress online 
speech by a Democrat or Republican, the FTC could deny it a certification of 
neutrality through the vote of at least one Democratic or Republican member. 
Unlike the Fairness Doctrine, both parties could be assured that the neu-
trality standard would not be used against their partisans because leaders 
of both parties would have an effective veto over actions by the companies. 
However, this supermajority rule—although an effort to mitigate majori-
tarian suppression of online speech—is paired with a problematic affirmative 
obligation. Online platforms are by default unprotected by Section 230 until 
the FTC certifies them as neutral and thus protected. This would make the 
entire review process particularly susceptible to filibustering. Given that 
four of five votes would be needed to certify, the two minority party commis-
sioners, voting in unison, could block certification. It is not hard to imagine 
the political possibilities that could be reaped from this system. Any two 
commissioners could exercise enormous political and financial leverage 
over online platforms.
Consider the following scenario. In May 2019, the Trump administration 
invited conservatives who felt that they had been censored by social media 
platforms to submit complaints to a White House website. Three months 
later those complaints were then used to justify drafting an executive order 
titled “Protecting Americans from Online Censorship,” which proposed 
doing via executive power what Hawley had proposed doing via legislation, 
that is, removing Section 230 protection from biased internet platforms.84 
The executive order was never issued, but if, in some alternate universe, 
Hawley’s bill had been enacted earlier that summer, the president would 
then have had a powerful tool for advancing his partisan interests under the 
guise of advancing the public interest. He could have encouraged his ardent 
supporters to submit a wave of complaints to the FTC. If just two of the three 
Republican commissioners could be suborned, the administration would 
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have been able to deny certification to any online platform, using neutrality 
as a pretext for dampening criticism of Trump during a crucial period in his 
presidency. That did not happen, of course, but it is not hard to imagine how 
the FTC’s neutrality authority could be abused for partisan gain.
But the question is not just whether the companies might suppress 
speech under partisan or ideological pressure from the FTC. Under Hawley’s 
bill the companies would be fundamentally dependent on an agency of 
the federal government to operate (assuming that the protections against 
liability afforded by Section 230 are essential to the firms). These private 
companies are, at present, not covered by the First Amendment. Partisans 
could demand sub silentio that content moderators suppress disfavored 
speech in return for a neutrality certification. Hence, the leverage the agency 
would have over the company might well translate into censorship with no 
recourse to the courts. Furthermore, non-mainstream political speech might 
find it difficult to secure enthusiastic defenders from representatives of either 
party. Neutrality violations that hurt these radical speakers might very well 
be compatible with certification. Indeed, private content moderators, left to 
guess whether they should suppress speakers disliked by both parties, might 
do so in order to safely obtain a certificate of neutrality rather than out of any 
particular partisan affiliation.
The historical episodes we have discussed demonstrate the problem of 
mainstream apathy towards the suppression of radical speech. Bob Shuler, 
although a Republican, had alienated both the Republican and Democratic 
parties on the local level, leaving him with few political allies to speak for 
him when the FRC revoked his radio station license. Socialist radio station 
owners fought similar pressures from both Republican and Democratic FRC 
commissioners in the 1930s. Right-wing broadcasters in the 1960s, targeted by 
the Kennedy administration and the DNC with the Fairness Doctrine, quickly 
found that Richard Nixon had no interest in helping radical conservatives 
who had attacked his China policy.
Hawley’s Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act is likely a stillborn 
effort to regulate content online. And perhaps other proposals will avoid 
these free speech issues, but history suggests otherwise. If the government 
is empowered to advance the public interest online, it will necessarily affect 
the moderation decisions of private companies. Given our current polarized 
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politics, a handful of newly empowered public officials are likely to view 
Facebook similarly to how Richard Nixon saw CBS News: as an opportunity 
to extract political rents.
That comparison is more relevant than you might think. Both CBS News 
(in the past) and Facebook (in the present) engage in content discrimination; 
there are no constitutional grounds to protest their actions. While elected offi-
cials have a natural interest in controlling what is said about them, they cannot 
effectively punish their online critics. Regulations that do not impose content 
discrimination, either explicitly or implicitly, fall outside our analysis, but we 
wonder whether such regulations are likely. Given the history of partisan abuse 
of the public interest standard in broadcasting, the burden of proof should rest 
with those advocating for a public interest standard for the internet to show 
that their rules would not impose new restrictions on free speech.
We believe that the implications of this history reach beyond public policy. 
Social media companies have responded to criticism by moderating content 
on their platforms, but they have also legitimized speech suppression through 
quasi-judicial institutions.85 For example, Facebook is about to launch an inde-
pendent oversight board to hear user appeals to decisions made by its content 
moderators.86 Given that they are private institutions, both Facebook’s mod-
eration policy and the board’s judgments would not be obligated to observe 
First Amendment protections for speech.87 Facebook’s CEO has stated that 
his company considers free speech a “paramount value.”88 However, social 
media companies retain the power to police their platforms. 
Such authority, though fully justified, opens up significant risks to free 
speech. Elected and unelected government officials have an interest in what 
is taken down or left up on social media. They might gain leverage over the 
platforms through some sort of licensing scheme as proposed by Senator 
Hawley. Even absent that degree of control, the possibility of government 
intervention places pressure on Silicon Valley; in order to avoid direct gov-
ernment regulation, online platforms might embrace industry-wide self-reg-
ulation standards that suppress political or radical speech. As we have seen, 
if a government agency has the power to regulate social media in the public 
interest, such leverage over the platforms is all the more likely to be effective.
 How then should we respond to new efforts to regulate social media? 
History cannot tell us with precision what the correct path forward is, but 
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the history recounted here does suggest that novel regulations imposed on 
new communication technologies tend to spawn free speech challenges. 
Given the risk of regulatory capture of a new internet regulatory agency 
by political incumbents who could use their power to suppress dissident 
speech, we propose contesting any such regulations through the courts on 
First Amendment grounds. Internet searches and platform curation, like 
the editorial judgment of a newspaper, deserve constitutional protection 
from government encroachment.89 First Amendment concerns would also 
preclude the internet equivalent of platform licensing. We may even need 
explicit constitutional protections favoring private regulation of technology 
and opposing government censorship of the internet.
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